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SCHOOL EVALUATION: WHEN THE FACTS AREN'T ENOUGH

by
Wayne M. Carroll

I recently had occasion to take a second look at the report of a school evaluation
project in which I had participated some time ago. The study consisted of a half dozen
random and representative surveys of population associated with the school and the
gathering of achievement test scores as well as economic, social and other demographic data
about the school community. The committee had determined the type of information to be
gathered after studying the school's philosophy and objectives statements, the school's policy
manual, and a handbook prepared for parents and students in which the school's curriculum,
rules and regulations and extracurricular activities were summarized. The committee sought
to evaluate the school on the basis of examining to what extent the school reflected the
needs and desires of its community and to what extent its programs and services were
consistent with the statements and descriptions provided in the various publications. The
surveys involved hundreds of individuals; response totals and the summary of additional data
occupy many pages in this rather impressive epistle. The committee had intended to
produce an empirical, e.g. a scientific and objective, report. 1 This report looked "scientific."
As I studied the report, I could see that in some ways the data could be analyzed as
consistent and in other ways as contradictory. I wondered why I hadn't seen the
inconsistencies earlier. As I read on, I became uneasy with some of the generalizations to
which I had made no small contribution. How could I have been satisfied with this report?
I could see now that all this data failed to yield a really satisfactory understanding of this
school. True, I and my co-workers were able to describe many characteristics and aspects
of the school, but I was uneasy that the school had become too much the product of this
data, something we had unintentionally created. Was the school we described in this report
essentially the school as it truly existed?
The Dangers of Graduate School
There had been some significant changes in my professional life since I participated
in that school evaluation. Otherwise I might never have taken my copy of that evaluation
report, reread it, and become dissatisfied with the report and with myself. I had progressed
deeply into doctoral studies during the intervening years and had completed a number of
courses which had made me aware of a variety of research approaches about which I had
been ignorant or had only a passing knowledge. In one course, I read Sara Lawrence
Lightfoot's The Good High School: Portraits of Character and Culture (1983). Comparing
the rather sterile school evaluation report with Lightfoot's book, I realized that what the
report failed to communicate was what Lightfoot called the ethnos of the school. I had
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missed the forest for the trees. Now I recalled that even when the evaluation report had
been completed, I bad been a bit uneasy. My intuition told me something was missing, but
what was intuition? Certainly it was not part of the objective research approach with which
I was familiar. My co-workers thought the evaluation was quite objective and professional.
When I had raised a few questions, I was admonished not to "read too much into the data.
Let the data speak for themselves." Now, as I reviewed the report, the data consisted of a
narrow and one-sided conversation.
In Awakening the Inner Eye: Intuition in Education (1984), Nel Noddings and Paul
J. Shore discuss the potential of intuition in educational practice. From their book, I came
to see that I should not have been so hesitant to follow up on my intuition. Noddings and
Shore noted that Aristotle had described intuition as "the knowledge that exists without
proof' (1984, p. 7). Aristotle was of the opinion that some knowledge bad to exist without
proof or the process of reasoning would amount to nothing more than endless reductionisms.
He thought that intuitively known truths ranked above even the universals of science and
were indispensable for scientific inquiry. Noddings and Shore present a satisfying
explanation of intuition as characterized by receptivity, involvement of the senses, the quest
for understanding, and a tension between subjective certainty and objective certainty (1984,
p. 202). In educational research, and I would suppose in many other academic areas,
intuition can be a motivator, a spark, a jumping-off point. It serves to yield up the question
or present the problem. I should have followed up on my intuition. What that school
evaluation had been was a rather limited enquiry into a world that we, the researchers, had
created through our survey instruments and imposed upon those who had assisted us. What
world had we failed to perceive?
Einstein Opened New Worlds for Educational Researchers

Albert Einstein's theory of relativity presented us with a new and different world
from the one which we had known since the sixteenth century. Lincoln Barnett in The
Universe and Dr. Einstein (1972) explains that the world we had known was based on
observation and empiricism -- positive pillars of the scientific method. The world of science
was one of three dimensions, measurable and observable. But Einstein's world was neither.
It could only be grasped through the logic of mathematics, through a process based on
intuitive thought. Perhaps Einstein's most significant accomplishment was to realize the
limits placed on knowledge when enquiry was shackled by artificial, preconceived notions
of reality. Einstein was able to conceive of science, in Schubert's words, "as a fluid and
imaginative use of the logic of scientific inquiry that adapted to situations (as Dewey
advocated), an interpretation that great scientists employed since the Renaissance" (1986,
p. 134). What science had done was to announce the tools by which it would examine
reality and then proceeded to proclaim that reality was what these tools revealed.
Somewhere along the way we seemed to forget the very artificiality of our research
methodology. By insisting that "truth" could only be known through our limited and, with
hindsight, inadequate research methodologies, we succumbed to the idols of which Francis
Bacon, whom some regard as the father of modern science, had warned us in N ovum
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Organum (1620). In our efforts to better understand schools and schooling, attempts to
employ various forms of the scientific; method in educational studies are quite common and
include true or quasiexperiments, pre- and post-tests, minimal competency exams, normed
achievement tests, representative surveys, questionnaires, inventories, and the like. Wilfred
Carr and Stephen Kemmis write that " ... the hypothetico-deductive account suggested by
the modern empiricist philosophy of science and defended by philosophers as different as
J. S. Mill, Nagle, and Hemple ... now enjoys a position of near orthodoxy" (1986, p. 63).
In recent decades, various thinkers in different fields have questioned the usefulness
and adequacy of positivistic approaches in studies of humans and their condition (Popper,
1972; Feyerbend, 1975; Charlesworth, 1982). The positivistic theories used with traditional
science do not seem to provide as much understanding as they do data. And that
understanding was what I sensed was missing in the school evaluation report I had helped
to create. I could describe that school beginning with per capita expenditure and ending
with daily average attendance. I could tell you about its racial composition and what
percentage of the parents had earned college degrees. I could list average student-teacher
ratios and cite ACT and SAT scores, but for the life of me I could not honestly tell you that
I understood much about that school. What values did the teachers and students bring into
the classroom, how much mutual respect did they hold for one another, what obstacles did
socioeconomic differences impose on the growth of students?
I know now that there are other methods of enquiry I might have used. In practical
terms, it would not have been easy. All my colleagues did not share my intuitive uneasiness;
time, personnel, budget constraints, mind sets would have presented very real limitations.
I hope, however, that my next school evaluation will involve a positivistic approach and
much, much more.
Additional Methods of Enquiry

Because of the dominance of the positivistic approach and the reader's familiarity
with it, I won't present arguments in its defense; these should be sufficiently understood by
all. But it is valuable, I think, to present some of the criticisms. The positivistic approach
claims to be based on an objective knowledge which, upon consideration, we see really
doesn't exist. Thomas Kuhn presents a convincing analysis of the nature of the scientific
methods in his most readable book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970),
explaining that scientific paradigms are adopted and used until they become inconsistent
with perceived reality at which time they are replaced in revolutionary fashion. Because
scientific theories are the products of the times in which they are created, they are of
necessity biased by the views popular during those times -- Bacon's Idols of the Marketplace
and of the Theatre. Researchers are indoctrinated "into the values and ideology that the
dominant scientific paradigm prescribes" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 75). And, especially
germane to education, positivistic methods hold that a necessary separation must exist
between research and practice when, in truth, it can be argued that they are one and the
same (Peters, 1956; Schwab, 1969).
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While positivistic methods are directed toward prediction and control, alternative
methods of inquiry -- the interpretive, for example -- seek "understanding, meaning and
action" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 83). While positivistic methods aim for value-neutral
explanations and identification of laws that operate beyond an individual's control,
interpretive methods recognize that human interaction is based on knowledge of the
individual's motivations and purposes. This knowledge can be obtained in many ways
ranging from phenomenology to ethnography. While Lightfoot's book presents "portraits"
of schools, William Ayers successfully uses ethnographic methods in his The Good Preschool
Teacher (1989) and Paul Willis achieves dramatic and emotional effects with his case study
in Learning to Labor (1977). Such information is not available through positivistic methods.
Interpretive methods do not acknowledge the existence of an objective reality subject to
cause-effect explanations and universal scientific laws. While positivistic studies are
informative and valuable, most individuals would agree that the qualitative works mentioned
above are deeply satisfying to read and provide valuable insights and understandings. They
move the process of enquiry forward.
Speaking the Same Language

By engaging teachers in our research efforts, we are able to clarify meanings and
motives. We understand better the consciousness of the teacher. We can learn to what
extent we have been communicating on the same wavelength, that is, if we share similar
meanings, motives, expectations. A student in a predominantly white suburban school who
says of another student, "He's really bad," may have a meaning quite different from that of
a student in a predominantly black urban school. Ask a teacher in one school if he or she
believes the school's discipline is "about right" and the conception of what constitutes
discipline is different from that of another teacher in a different school. "The 'objective'
character of society, then, is not some independent reality to which individuals are somehow
subject. Rather, society comes to possess a degree of objectivity because social actors, in
the process of interpreting their social world, externalize and objectify it" ( Carr and Kemmis,
1986, p. 84).

If we want to understand human behavior, we must take into consideration the
individual's motives and purposes so that we can uncover the subjective meaning of the
behavior. The shortcoming of my surveys was that I forced the participants to react to my
questions as I presented them. The participants did not necessarily know or share the
meaning I attached to a question and I, in turn, did not understand the significance of their
responses. By forcing the participants to select from the choices I provided on the surveys,
I not only invented the game, but forced the participants to play by my rules, that is, by the
consensus of meanings in which I shared, the consensus out of which the questions arose and
with which the participants might or might not have concurred. For example, the evaluation
committee began its work with a study of the various school publications assuming a
consensus of shared meanings. But these publications were the product of a very limited
number of individuals who may or may not have shared a consensus of meaning. I and the
evaluation committee assumed that the whole school community understood these
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publications in common. What I should have done was to gather a small sample of those
I surveyed and asked them to respond freely to my questions. I could have taken the
opportunity to determine if they understood the questions as I had intended them. Our
conversation would not have been confined to just the questions I had prepared, but would
have included new questions generated as a result of the conversation. Such a process
would have resembled a practical deliberation. My intent would not have been to somehow
manipulate their responses, but to see if we were both talking about basically the same thing
and in so doing, attempting to provide a deeper, richer understanding. I would have
gathered valuable information in addition to the positivistic data I had collected.

In my graduate studies I came to realize that depending on what method I employ,
the positivistic or the interpretive, I am presuming certain relationships between theory and
practice. Using the former, I continue to accept theory as apart from practice. Theory is
one thing and what I do is quite another. I wouldn't want to compromise my positivistic
study with considerations of its application to actual classroom practices. Using the
interpretive approach, no such clear distinction between theory and practice is possible. My
theory, such as it is, develops with and is constantly affected by my action of inquiry. The
insistence by some researchers to maintain the separation between theory and practice, I
think, is why many classroom teachers criticize their preservice and graduate school
education classes insisting that they see little if any relationship to what they intend to do
or actually do in their classrooms. But it can be argued that every teacher already possesses
a theory of education. It is what the teacher does on a continuing daily basis. The way a
teacher organizes and manages the classroom, within practical limitations, is a reflection of
that teacher's philosophy (Peters, 1959). The interpretive approach recognizes this state of
affairs and offers the potential for a more complete and reflective consideration of daily
classroom activity.
Schools Evaluations As Academic Exercise

It is almost distressing that in many instances a school evaluation is perceived by
educators as an academic exercise. As I look back upon my school evaluation study, it now
appears to me to have been just that. It is the "theory" of which teachers complain. That
evaluation most likely had little impact on daily practice in that school. I would wager fifty
cents to a hole in a donut that the evaluation report can be found today gathering dust on
a shelf somewhere in that school's main office. What should be the purpose of school
evaluations? Most educators would agree it should be to help improve instruction. It can
do this and more. And the addition of a critical dimension to an interpretive study might
help move the evaluation away from theory and into practice. But how many researchers
would object to the presumption that a specific study aims to achieve practical results? The
propinquity of some scientists to insist that good research is pure research and seeks nothing
more than knowledge itself is disturbing. "Don't read too much into the data."
Is it really possible that even positivistic research has no goal but the generation of
pure knowledge? Upon reflection, it becomes inconceivable that an individual would
23

engage in any serious, disciplined, but essentially aimless activity; there is always some
reason, some motivator, some end sought and the explanation "pure knowledge" seems to
me to be too easy a rationalization for avoiding more serious consideration. If the
positivistic researcher desires "pure knowledge," at the least it is to confirm or deny some
aspect of the particular paradigm employed. The research may begin with an intuitive
hunch. It would seem that as many profound scientific discoveries have been achieved
serendipitously as through a disciplined quest for pure knowledge.
For the educational researcher, there is always some goal whether it be simply the
improvement of instruction or the answering of the eternal question, "What is most worth
knowing?" One of the more obvious differences between the "hard sciences" and
educational research is that the latter more openly and obviously aims to apply the fruits
of its labors. It may be said that positivistic research summarizes its research findings in
quantities -- so many of this and that, given such and such an error within such and such a
confidence interval -- and interpretative research attempts to supply a quality to the
phenomenon studied. In doing this it is difficult to hide the biases of the researcher and,
so often, these are and should be clearly expressed. While the biases of the qualitative
researcher are by comparison easy to identify, those of the positivistic researcher are
assumed to be minimal due to the touted "objective" nature of the method. Nevertheless,
the biases are there. In the one, they are inherent in the paradigm used; in the other, the
biases are communicated on a study-by-study basis. When we begin to question the covert
biases, that is, when we apply our reasoning power to an examination of the link between
what we hold to be our theory and what we actually do, we are on the road toward critical
theory.
A teacher expresses his or her philosophy in the teaching act. But if the situation is
never formally examined, if there is no reflection, if the teacher does not engage in some
phenomenological exercise, deeper understanding is not achieved. What is needed is a more
critical attitude by teachers about their instruction, indeed about all their educational
activities. Here we move from the strictly interpretive approach to a more critical one.
What if it becomes apparent to us that the consciousness of the teacher for what constitutes
good educational practice is based on a misguided, incorrect or harmful premise? What if
the environment itself is maladaptive or pathological? Do we follow in Star Trek fashion
The Prime Directive not to become involved, or do we attempt to make the teacher aware
of possible inconsistencies or even encourage change to take place?
It is probably safe to say that in most schools change is not particularly welcomed.
This is not surprising when we acknowledge that schools are in fact elaborate bureaucracies.
Lines of communication are developed, schedules set, habits formed. It's our natural
tendency to become comfortable with the way things are if for no other reason than because
we prefer the familiar. Interpretive research does not threaten schools in an all-powerful
and overt fashion. Rather change, if it occurs as a result of the research, is slower and
subtle. Carr and Kemmis write that "interpretive approaches do not prescribe for action;
on the contrary, interpretations merely inform teachers about the nature, consequences and
24

practical judgments in deciding how to act" (1986, p. 152). The teacher becomes aware of
the conditions that influence behavior and is better able to understand them.
But when we concentrate seriously on the relationship between theory and practice,
we essentially engage in critical theory. Critical theory is an appeal to reason as opposed
to the mere acceptance of the technical tools of positivistic science. The interpretive
method has the advantage of recognizing that educational research must somehow
incorporate the self-understanding of teachers for what they do. But what if the
interpretation that teachers give for their work is itself flawed by maladaptive practice or
a pathological environment? How then do we go about helping teachers to see the biases
under which they work? How do we approach ideologies that are counter-productive? One
possibility is to engage in a critical or action-oriented approach.
A Critical and Action-Oriented Approach to Bring About Change

Critical theory arose from the so-called Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School
hoped to emancipate individuals from positivistic "domination of thought" by encouraging
individuals to reflect on their own understandings and actions. "Critical theory" has taken
on many forms and meanings ranging from phenomenological enquiry to determined efforts
to alter ideological systems or right social injustices. In terms of my school evaluation, I
have in mind phenomenological activity. The value of phenomenological enquiry and the
process by which this can be undertaken is explained by Max van Manen (1984). It holds
the potential for a personal liberation achieved through an introspective process of selfquestioning.
Employing critical or action research theory we act as. a mirror for teachers,
encouraging them to find any inconsistencies in their beliefs and practices. A teacher may
tell us, for example, that he or she believes in encouraging each student to form
independent and defensible decisions, but in practice, the teacher dominates the class and
covertly forces views on students denying them an opportunity to form their own opinions.
To the extent that we value research which is not so much about education as it is intended
to be for education, we enter the realm of action research. This clearly involves the
practitioners of education -- namely the teachers, but it could also include the students,
parents, administrators, board members and taxpayers as well. Carr and Kemmis tell us that
"The objects of action research -- the things that action researchers research and that they
aim to improve -- are their own educational practices, their understandings of these
practices, and the situation in which they practice" (1986, p. 180). They are not content with
interpretive research because it assumes that a person's actions will change as the person's
consciousness of that action is changed. They agree that the participants must have a
deeper understanding of their practices, but they are also interested in identifying the
constraints to improvement and in helping to remove or overcome these constraints. Action
research is a collaborative process and, once begun, should be a continuing process. It can
be perceived as a threat to university academians and to bureaucratic administrators in that
wisdom emanates from the practitioners and focus of control is at the grassroots level. As
25

long as practitioners, students, parents and others are actively engaged, the process will
resist institutionalization, which is to say it will not evolve into a type of set positivistic
paradigm and thus defeat itself. We should confront teachers with the inconsistencies
between their stated goals and their practices and determine what can be done to help them
achieve their goals.
The school evaluation project in which I participated should never have ended with
a summative report. Instead, that report should have been the beginning of a project of
questioning, self-reflection, and involvement. The positivistic data had value. In addition
to summarizing how much that was appropriate for summarization, it could have served as
a jumping-off point for all those involved in the educational activities of that school to begin
talking about what they were doing, why they were doing it, and what they thought should
be done. It could have served as a catalyst for change. What I have learned is simply that
facts are necessary, but insufficient. To conduct a proper school evaluation, we must also
involve individuals in a series of qualitative activities that reflect interpretive, critical theory,
and action-research approaches. Otherwise, the evaluation process will suffer a premature
death and there will be a report gathering dust on some shelf.

NOTES
1

"Empirical" as I use the term includes positivistic, quantitative, and theoretic research
ranging from Franklin Bobbit to B. F. Skinner. It's the type of research approach with
which most of us in education were made familiar as undergraduates and which dominates
educational research today.
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